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Industrial relations in the German automobile industry are tense. This appears to be largely 
because of competitive pressure stemming from Central European countries. Automobile 
assemblers as well as autoparts producers press hard for labour cost reductions which they 
deem necessary for Germany to defend this traditional manufacturing stronghold: 
•  In return for DaimlerChrysler’s promise to secure the jobs at its Mercedes car plant in 
southern Germany for eight years, the workers and their trade union agreed to wage 
restraint and longer working hours for part of the labour force in July 2004. 
•  Opel, the German subsidiary of General Motors, decided in mid-2004 to locate part of 
its Zafira production in Gliwice, Poland, even though the assembly line at the 
company’s headquarter in Rüsselsheim had considerable spare capacity. The decision 
was based on a comparative analysis that revealed strong competitive advantages of 
the former location. The next blow came when General Motors demanded from its 
European subsidiaries, notably from Opel, to cut thousands of jobs. 
•  At the same time, Volkswagen threatened to lay off about 30.000 workers in Germany 
unless workers agreed to a wage freeze and a cost reduction of 30 percent by 2011. 
For newly recruited workers in the production of VW minivans, an agreement on more 
flexible working hours and lower wages had already been concluded in 2003. 
•  Low-wage competition from the neighbouring Czech Republic notwithstanding, 
BMW decided to build its new production site in Saxony. However, Bosch, a major 
supplier of autoparts, revealed plans to relocate further 800 workplaces to the Czech 
Republic; the affected workers in Lyon, France, accepted longer working hours, 
without extra pay, to prevent this move. Other autoparts suppliers such as Continental,   2
a producer of tyres, demand to extend working hours in Germany in order to reduce 
labour costs. 
Similar developments can be observed in other industries. Yet the automobile industry offers 
a particularly interesting example to trace the fiercer competition of Central European 
countries as well as the production, trade and labour market repercussions for traditional 
locations such as Germany. In contrast to declining or stagnating industries such as clothing, 
steel or shipbuilding, the automobile industry in Germany continues to play a significant role. 
In recent years, employment in the production of automobiles and autoparts accounted for 12 
percent of employment in the manufacturing sector, and the industry’s contribution to 
investment in manufacturing exceeded 20 percent (VDA  b,  2004:  352). Spatz and 
Nunnenkamp (2002a) show that the German automobile industry performed better than the 
manufacturing average in terms of employment generation and average wage payments in the 
1980s and 1990s. The contribution of exports of road vehicles (SITC 78) to Germany’s total 
exports of manufactures increased from 18.5 percent in 1993 to 23 percent in 2003 (OECD 
2004).
1 
Industry representatives stress several “signs of strength” of the German automobile industry, 
especially with regard to assembly operations (VDA 2004a): 2003 marked the sixth year in a 
row with domestic passenger car production exceeding five million units. At the same time, 
employment increased and the industry exceeded expectations by exporting an unprecedented 
number of 3.7 million passenger cars. Since 1992 the exports of automobiles have 
increasingly surpassed the number of imported automobiles (Nunnenkamp 2004); only Japan 
and France exported more automobiles than Germany in 2003 (VDA  a,  2004: 352).   
Germany’s share in world production of passenger cars, exceeding 10 percent in 2003, was 
four times the combined share of six Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) (VDA a, 2003: 345). The Central European 
countries are not even listed in this source as major exporters of automobiles. 
Nevertheless, the subsequent analysis will show that the economic transformation of Central 
European countries has resulted in significantly increased competitive pressure. There is 
reason for at least part of the workforce in the German automobile industry to be concerned 
                                                 
1   According to VDA (2004b: 59), the German automobile industry achieved an export surplus of  € 78 billion 
in 2003.   3
about impaired employment and income prospects.
2 The analytical framework underlying the 
proposition of labour market repercussions of automobile production by German companies 
in Central Europe is summarized in Section II. Section III indicates that the relocation of 
assembly operations affects domestic production by inducing more imports of automobiles 
and, possibly, also by reducing the growth of exports from the German home base. Section IV 
deals with competitive pressure stemming from outsourcing of automotive inputs. Labour 
market effects are discussed in Section V. We conclude that, even in relatively technology 
and human-capital intensive segments of manufacturing such as the automobile industry,
3 the 
economic transformation of Central Europe has significant labour market repercussions in 
more advanced EU countries such as Germany. 
 
II. Analytical  Background 
Based on standard theoretical models on the distributional effects of the liberalization of trade 
with, and foreign direct investment (FDI) in lower-income countries, the integration of 
Central Europe into international production and sourcing networks can be expected to 
negatively affect the labour market situation of relatively low skilled workers in high-income 
countries such as Germany (Spatz and Nunnenkamp 2002b: 477).
4 The recent literature on the 
motives and effects of FDI offers further insights which help analyse the labour market 
repercussions of automobile production in countries with relatively low per-capita income. 
Marin et al. (2003) argue that the wage and employment effects of outward FDI by 
economically advanced countries in lower-income countries, e.g., in Central Europe, depend 
on the type of FDI : 
•  Companies undertaking horizontal FDI produce the same goods and services in their 
home country and in the host countries.
5 This type of FDI is often motivated by trade 
                                                 
2    In this paper, we do not address another reason for concern, namely the employment implications of 
overcapacity problems the automobile industry is facing on an international scale. For instance, General 
Motors has announced in the fall of 2004 that assembly operations will be discontinued either at one of 
Opel’s plants in Germany or at Saab’s plant in Sweden. 
3   Vickery (1996) and Weiß (2000) show that the development and manufacturing of automobiles requires 
increasing R&D and involves significant fixed costs. 
4   For details, see the literature given there. 
5   For an early model of horizontal FDI, see Markusen (1984); more recent models include Markusen and 
Venables (1998; 2000).   4
barriers, transportation costs and other transaction costs that discourage exports (Carr et al. 
2001). FDI is a means to avoid such costs. Horizontal FDI is driven by market 
considerations. That is why this type of FDI is also known as market-seeking FDI (e.g., 
UNCTAD 1998: 91). 
•  Companies undertaking vertical FDI fragment the production process geographically and 
locate specific stages of the value chain in countries offering the relevant cost advantages.
6 
This type of FDI is motivated by cost considerations. Investors make use of varying factor 
endowments and differences in factor prices across countries (Zhang and Markusen 1999). 
FDI of this type is also known as efficiency-seeking FDI (UNCTAD 1998: 91). 
According to Marin et al. (2003), wage inequality or unemployment in economically 
advanced economies will increase if outward FDI is of the vertical type. This is because the 
investor relocates the relatively labour intensive stages of production to low-income countries, 
thereby reducing the demand for unskilled workers in the home country. Unless unskilled 
workers agree to lower relative wages, they will face deteriorating employment opportunities. 
By contrast, these authors do not expect horizontal FDI to have effects on wage inequality or 
employment opportunities in the advanced country. 
However, the differentiation between horizontal and vertical FDI is not as clear-cut as it might 
appear at first sight. On the one hand, the labour market implications of vertical FDI depend 
on whether the cost reduction associated with such a strategy results in an overall expansion 
of the investing company, including complementary operations at home (Becker et al. 2004). 
On the other hand, FDI appears to be horizontal if automobile companies engage in assembly 
operations in foreign countries and the same final good, namely finished cars, is produced at 
home and abroad. Yet, under certain circumstances, this engagement may be motivated by 
cost considerations and can, thus, have labour market repercussions at home. For instance, 
this may be the case if the automobile company produces higher quality cars at home, but 
relocates the production of models serving the lower segment of the market to countries 
offering cost advantages in the assembly of such cars. Even FDI undertaken for the assembly 
of cars that are similar to those assembled at home can be considered vertical in nature as long 
                                                 
6   For an early model of vertical FDI, see Helpman (1984); see also Helpman and Krugman (1985).   5
as technology intensive and human-capital intensive activities such as the design and 
development of cars are concentrated in the relatively skill-abundant home country.
7 
In the literature, the composition of sales by the foreign affiliates of multinational companies 
has been used as a criterion to reveal the type of FDI (Hanson et al. 2001; Marin et al. 2003). 
FDI is considered horizontal if foreign affiliates sell their output (almost) exclusively in the 
host country. By contrast, a high share of affiliate sales destined for markets other than the 
host country is taken as an indication of vertical FDI. Especially if a substantial share of the 
output of foreign affiliates is exported back to the home country of the investor, the foreign 
engagement of this investor can be regarded as vertical. 
As concerns the engagement of German automobile companies in Central Europe, recent 
models of vertical and horizontal FDI offer several arguments to expect labour market 
repercussions in Germany, even though market considerations are typically shown to be 
important in surveys on FDI in Central Europe (Lansbury et al. 1996: 104). The motive for 
horizontal FDI to avoid high trade and transaction costs associated with exporting from the 
German home base should be of minor importance for serving Central European markets.
8 
These markets are fairly close to the home base of German investors (i.e., transportation costs 
are relatively low), and the protection of these markets is rather weak as trade costs resulting 
from import barriers have been removed since various countries prepared for EU 
membership.
9 Moreover, Central European markets for (new) automobiles are relatively small 
compared to the German home market.
10 This limits the potential to exploit (plant-level) 
economies of scale in assembly operations located in Central European countries, which, in 
turn, should reduce the incentive to engage in horizontal FDI (Carr et al. 2001). 
                                                 
7   Carr et al. (2001) derive the motive for vertical FDI, i.e., locating knowledge intensive activities such as 
R&D where skilled labour is relatively cheap and production where unskilled labour is relatively cheap, from 
two assumptions: (i) knowledge intensive activities can be geographically separated from production and 
supplied to production facilities at low cost, and (ii) production requires less skills than activities such as 
R&D. 
8   In Helpman’s (1984) model of vertical FDI, trade costs were assumed to be zero. As noted by Carr et al. 
(2001), this assumption, in combination with plant-level economies of scale, removes the motive for 
horizontal FDI. 
9    Prospective EU member countries had abolished import duties on cars imported from the EU by 2001 (van 
Tulder 2004: 106). 
10   Even in Poland, i.e., the largest Central European market for automobiles, first registrations of passenger cars 
in 2003 hardly exceeded one tenth of first registrations in Germany (VDA b).   6
On the other hand, different factor endowments and factor price differentials between 
Germany and Central Europe, in combination with low trade costs and geographical 
proximity, provide incentives to undertake vertical FDI in this region. Yet, Central Europe 
tends to be better endowed of relatively skilled labour than many developing countries. 
According to Zhang and Markusen (1999: 237), the case for vertical FDI no longer exists if 
“countries become extremely different”, i.e., sufficiently skilled labour being so scarce in the 
potential host country that multinational companies will find it difficult to hire local staff such 
as technicians and administrative employees. Likewise, vertical FDI is supposed to depend on 
the host country meeting minimum standards with regard to power supply, transport and 
telecommunication infrastructure as well as legal institutions. In contrast to many developing 
countries, it can safely be assumed that Central European countries fulfil these basic 
requirements for vertical FDI to take place. 
Finally, the expectation of labour market repercussions of the German automobile companies’ 
engagement in Central Europe is based on previous empirical studies on FDI in this region. 
The estimation results of Carstensen and Toubal (2003) indicate that both types of FDI exist 
in Central Europe. These authors find a robust and strong impact of the market potential of 
host countries on FDI. However, market considerations explain only partly the motivation of 
multinational companies to invest in the region; relative unit labour costs are also shown to 
exert a significant influence on FDI. Marin et al. (2003) show that the affiliates of German 
companies in the machinery and transport equipment sector of Central and Eastern European 
countries deliver almost 40 percent of production to their German parents, which, according 
to Hanson et al. (2001), is a clear indication of vertical FDI. 
 
III.  Car Assembly in Central Europe and Substitution Effects in Germany 
The regime change in Central and Eastern Europe, the region’s opening up to world markets 
and, in particular, the accession of various countries to the EU promised not only new markets 
and export opportunities for German automobile producers, but also offered profitable 
investment opportunities.
11 As argued in the preceding section, concerns that automobile 
production by German companies in Central Europe has labour market repercussions at home 
are reasonable if host countries are integrated into corporate networks by means of vertical 
                                                 
11   See also van Tulder (2004: 99) and the literature given there.   7
FDI. Data limitations prevent us from clearly identifying the type of FDI in Central Europe. 
Nevertheless, the evidence we present in this and the subsequent section suggests that the 
activities of the German automobile industry in this region are not restricted to horizontal 
FDI. 
FDI by the German automobile industry, including autoparts, in Central and Eastern Europe 
has gained considerable momentum. According to Bundesbank data, FDI stocks soared 
almost fivefold since 1995 to € 5.4 billion in 2002 (Figure 1). Since the late 1990s, Central 
and Eastern Europe has hosted higher FDI stocks than Latin America, which had traditionally 
been the preferred investment location of the German automobile industry outside the 
advanced OECD area. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland accounted for more than 80 
percent of FDI stocks in the region in 2002.
12 FDI stocks held by the German automobile 
industry in Hungary exceeded those in China, even though automobile multinationals 
consider China to be the most promising market and are eager to build or acquire production 
capacities there. 
Figure 1 — Automobiles  and  Parts Industry: German FDI Stocks in Central and Eastern 
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aIncluding former USSR; for list of included countries, see the source. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2004). 
                                                 
12   The Slovak Republic, most likely, accounts for much of the rest, mainly because of Volkswagen's 
engagement in this country. However, the Slovak Republic is not listed as an individual host country in the 
Bundesbank statistics (Deutsche Bundesbank 2004).   8
Buch et al. (2003) show that the market size of host countries has a relatively large impact on 
FDI in the automobile industry. Market opportunities have been a driving force of FDI in 
Central Europe, too. Bechert and Cellarius (2004) note that “the great majority” of local 
employees of German subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe “are also involved in 
production that is intended for local markets.” Sturgeon and Florida (1999: 53) find “a large 
measure of convergence toward building vehicles where they are sold.” In contrast to China 
and Latin America, however, the attractiveness of Central Europe is not restricted to local 
markets. At the same time, Central Europe has emerged as an export platform for German 
automobile producers.
13 Production and trade data for passenger cars (units) indicate that the 
character of German FDI in Central Europe differs from that in China and Latin America 
(Table 1). 
Table 1 — Passenger Cars: Foreign Production by German Companies and German Imports 
and Exports, 1990–2003 (1000 units) 
  Central Europea  China  Brazil and Mexico 
  prod. imp. exp. prod. imp. exp. prod. imp. exp. 
1990 0.0  11.0 6.6 0.0 0.0 2.8  425.8 1.3 1.1 
1996 240.1  68.9 126.2 226.4  0.0  4.0 735.0  6.9  11.9 
2002 782.4 261.6 100.7 437.6  0.3  22.9 799.8  24.0  33.9 
2003 733.9 270.6 115.8 624.8  3.5  44.2 716.4  45.5  28.4 
aCzech Rep., Hungary, Poland and Slovak Rep. 
Source: VDA (a). 
In China and Latin America (proxied by the most important locations, Brazil and Mexico), car 
production of German companies developed independently from trade. German car exports to 
these markets hardly existed before companies invested there; exports were no reasonable 
option because of high import barriers. As a consequence, labour market repercussions in 
                                                 
13  Humphrey and Memedovic (2003: 34) reckon: “The initial attraction for…extending production networks 
from…Western Europe to the peripheral regions was a combination of access to growing markets and 
reducing costs through the development of low-cost production sites.” For a similar line of reasoning with 
regard to Volkswagen’s acquisition of Skoda, see Pries (1999). The survey results of Dichtl and Hardock 
(1997) reveal that labour costs played an important role in motivating the first waves of relocation to Central 
Europe. Van Tulder and Ruigrok (1998) as well as van Tulder (2004) point out that European car 
manufacturers pursued different strategies: Some companies rated Central Europe primarily as a market, 
some as a production site, and some aimed at both.   9
Germany resulting from exports being replaced by foreign production are highly unlikely. At 
the same time, German car imports from China and Latin America remained marginal 
throughout the period under consideration, largely because production in China and Brazil 
lacked international competitiveness and transportation costs are high. Hence, production in 
Germany could hardly be affected negatively by rising imports from these locations. 
A different situation prevails with regard to Central Europe. About one third of car production 
by German companies in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic was 
destined for the German market in recent years. German car imports from these countries 
have quadrupled since 1996 (Figure 2).  Van Tulder and Ruigrok (1998: 10) expect this 
development to have labour market repercussions in Germany, as “the (threat of) 
reimportations puts the domestic bargaining arena under pressure.” 
Figure  2  —  Production of Passenger Cars by German Companies in Central Europea and 
















aCzech Rep., Hungary, Poland and Slovak Rep. 
Source: VDA (a). 
   10
Labour market repercussions resulting from car imports may be moderate for the time being. 
The ratio of imports from the four Central European locations to passenger car production in 
Germany increased substantially from 1.5 percent in 1995/96, but the ratio hardly exceeded 
the 5 percent mark in 2002/03. Moreover, it might be questioned that assembly operations in 
Germany were affected significantly since producers such as Volkswagen used production 
sites in Central Europe to complement their existing product range. As pointed out by van 
Tulder and Ruigrok (1998), the focus of production in Central Europe was on relatively cheap 
lower-end cars. Consequently, substitution effects may be minor even though a division of 
labour of this sort may involve vertical FDI (Section II).  
However, German car exports to the four Central European countries increased by much less 
than German imports. As a result, Germany reported an import surplus of about 170.000 units 
per annum in 2000-2003. Furthermore, the import surplus is no longer in terms of units only, 
as observed in the 1990s by van Tulder and Ruigrok (1998). In value terms, the German trade 
balance for motor vehicles (including chassis) vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe switched 
from an export surplus of almost € 1 billion in 1995 to a deficit of € 1.3 billion in 2002 
(Figure 3). While Germany maintained an export surplus against various countries in the 
region, notably the Russian Federation, the trade balance turned negative for all four major 
production locations in Central Europe.
14 
The pattern of German exports of passenger cars shown in Figure 2 provides further clues to 
substitution effects. Exports peaked in 1996 and remained almost flat thereafter, i.e., exactly 
when production by German automobile companies in the region soared from about 200.000 
units per annum to about 750.000 units per annum in 2002/03. It is almost impossible to 
decide how exports to Central European countries would have developed if German 
companies were not engaged in assembly operations in these countries. Yet, it is striking that 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic together absorbed less German 
exports of passenger cars than neighbouring Austria in 2002 (Nunnenkamp 2004). Additional 
substitution effects may have occurred on third markets if German companies exported 
assembled cars from Central European production locations to markets other than the German 
 
                                                 
14   For detailed statistical information, see VDA (2004b: 59-68).   11
Figure 3 — Trade  Balancea for Motor Vehiclesb: Germany vis-à-vis Central and Eastern 


























aGerman exports minus German imports.— bIncluding chassis.— 
cIncluding Russian 
Federation; 2002 instead of 2003. 
Source: VDA (a). 
 
home market. Due to data constraints, it is not possible to assess the extent to which such 
exports replaced exports from Germany and, thus, affected domestic production of passenger 
cars. 
Finally, company-specific patterns of assembly operations in Central Europe, domestic 
production and (overall) exports offer insights on the likelihood, though not the quantitative 
importance, of substitution effects. In Table 2, we compare the significance of assembly 
operations in Central Europe by major German producers of passenger cars and utility 
vehicles in 2003 with the growth of domestic production and the growth of exports from the 
German home base. The latter two variables are expressed as the ratio of domestic production 
and exports in 2003 over production and exports in 1990; accordingly, figures below one 
correspond to shrinking production and exports, respectively. The clearest indication of 
substitution effects is that Volkswagen, whose passenger car production in Central Europe is 
outstandingly high (in absolute terms and as a share of domestic production), reported a 
considerable decline in domestic production as well as shrinking exports of passenger cars   12
from Germany.
15 The same company (slightly) increased domestic production of utility 
vehicles and reported rising exports in this segment of the automobile market for which 
assembly operations in Central Europe played a minor role. A decline in domestic production 
and relatively low export growth is also shown for Opel which ranked second, though by a 
wide margin, in terms of assembly in Central Europe. On the other hand, the growth of 
domestic production and the growth of exports from Germany typically turned out to be 
relatively high for companies which were not engaged in the assembly of cars in Central 
Europe.
16 
Table 2 —  German  Automobile  Companies:  Assembly in Central Europe, Domestic 
Production and Exports (1000 units) 
  Assembly in  
Central Europe, 
2003c 
Change in domestic 
production,  
2003 over 1990 
Change in exports, 
2003 over 1990 
Audi    34.0  (4.7)   1.72   2.12 
BMW    0   1.44   1.80 
DaimlerChryslera        
–  passenger  cars    0   1.71   2.07 
– utility vehicles    0    1.26    1.67 
MANb    1.2  (3.2)   1.25   2.77 
Opeld    76.5    (9.0)   0.82   1.24 
Porscheb    0   2.12   2.98 
Volkswagen      
– passenger cars    623.5 (56.5)    0.73    0.85 
– utility vehicles    2.4  (2.4)    1.13    1.48 
aExcluding Chrysler. — bExports of MAN and Porsche include exports of these companies 
to third markets from their production sites in Austria and Finland, respectively. — cIn 
parentheses: percent of domestic production. — dPassengers cars. 
Source: VDA (a). 
                                                 
15  Note that 80 percent of the production of Skoda’s Octavia was earmarked for exports to West European 
markets (van Tulder and Ruigrok 1998: 14). 
16   Audi represents an exception in that high growth of domestic production and exports went along with some 
assembly operations in Central Europe. Note that export figures for MAN and Porsche are not comparable to 
export figures for other companies as they include exports to third markets from MAN’s production site in 
Austria and from Porsche’s production site in Finland. 
   13
All in all, the evidence supports the view that assembly operations of German automobile 
companies in Central Europe differ from those in other host countries. Spatz and 
Nunnenkamp (2002a) did not find significant substitution effects between assembly 
operations in non-European countries with relatively low per-capita income and FDI stocks in 
these countries on the one hand, and domestic production and exports from the automobile 
multinationals’ home base on the other hand. However, these authors suspected already that 
the predominance of complementarities over substitution effects shown for the period 1981-
1998 would no longer hold once more recent data became available for production locations 
in Central Europe, which allowed for an internationally competitive assembly of automobiles 
close to European core markets. 
 
IV. Intra-industry  Trade 
Substitution effects at the level of assembled cars are not the only transmission mechanism 
through which the emergence of Central Europe as an important player in the automobile 
industry may have repercussions on German labour markets. Additional labour market effects 
can be expected to result from outsourcing of automobile parts production to Central Europe, 
for example through vertical FDI by car assemblers and so-called follow sourcing by parts 
suppliers.
17 This is even though Kleinert (2003) does not find strong support for the 
outsourcing hypothesis in time-series data on German FDI. As noted by this author, the 
finding that it is not so much outward FDI by German companies but rather FDI by foreign 
companies in Germany which drives German imports of intermediate goods may disguise that 
the importance of outsourcing differs strongly between industries and host countries. While 
horizontal FDI probably accounts for the bulk of outward FDI by German companies that 
enters the analysis of Kleinert (2003),
18 vertical FDI seems to play a prominent role in the 
case of FDI by the German automobile industry in Central Europe. 
Humphrey and Memedovic (2003) argue that changes in the strategies of automobile 
multinationals, particularly the integration of lower-income countries into corporate strategies, 
may be most obvious in car assembly, while even more significant changes were taking place 
                                                 
17   Follow sourcing results from the preference of car assemblers to use the same suppliers in various locations. 
18   Note that about 85 percent of German FDI stocks were located in industrialized countries in 2002 (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2004). Horizontal FDI is likely to dominate in these host countries due to strong similarities in 
factor endowments.   14
in the production of parts and components. At the same time, these authors reckon that the 
key driving force in the restructuring of the Central European automobile industry was the 
creation of production networks and a closer division of labour with Western Europe. Van 
Tulder and Ruigrok (1998) and van Tulder (2004) show that several automobile 
multinationals, including German ones, aimed at a vertical division of labour with Central 
Europe and have integrated host countries in this region into international sourcing networks. 
For instance, Audi’s and Opel’s investments in Hungary were mainly to supply parts and 
components (notably, engines) to Germany. In addition, Central European governments 
requested foreign car assemblers to help establish an advanced local industry of parts 
suppliers. For these reasons, companies such as Volkswagen developed local supplier bases in 
Central European host countries “through a mixture of encouraging follow sourcing by major 
transnational companies in components and the upgrading of existing local suppliers” 
(Humphrey and Memedovic 2003: 13). 
Various important component suppliers located close to the assembly lines of German car 
assemblers in Central Europe, for example close to Volkswagen’s production site in the 
Czech Republic (van Tulder and Ruigrok 1998: 27). All member firms of the Association of 
the German Automobile Industry (Verband der deutschen Automobilindustrie, VDA) employ 
about 160.000 workers in Central European countries that joined the EU recently; about 
100.000 of these workers are employed by autoparts suppliers (VDA 2004b: 37).
19 Parts 
suppliers had little choice but to follow the assemblers to new locations in Central Europe. 
According to Kinkel (2004), the pressure on parts suppliers to locate in the vicinity of their 
customers is particularly strong. Hence, it is difficult to argue that labour market conditions in 
Germany would be more favourable if parts suppliers had decided to supply the assemblers 
through exports from the German home base. 
Furthermore, outsourcing does not necessarily result in one-way intra-industry trade from 
Central Europe to Germany. The fragmentation of the value chain by car assemblers and 
follow sourcing by parts suppliers through outward FDI of German companies may indeed 
help sustain employment in Germany, as the analysis of Kleinert (2003) suggests. This is 
because the host countries of FDI tend to import not only assembled cars from where FDI 
originates, but also imports of intermediate goods originate predominantly from the home 
base of foreign investors. For instance, the export-oriented production of engines by German 
                                                 
19   VDA (2004b) includes an annex which lists major German suppliers engaged in Central European countries.   15
companies in Hungary relies heavily on inputs imported from Germany (Humphrey and 
Memedovic 2003). 
Nevertheless, the significance of intra-industry trade in autoparts between Central Europe and 
Germany is likely to have added to labour market pressure in Germany. In the remainder of 
this section, we provide a short summary of intra-industry trade with the four major host 
countries of German automobile companies in Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and the Slovak Republic). To keep the presentation of data within reasonable limits, 
we portray an overall picture by aggregating the most relevant items, i.e., engines and parts 
thereof as well as other parts and accessories.
20 
Figure 4 supports the view that Central Europe has increasingly become integrated into the 
production networks of German automobile companies. We relate the sum of German exports 
and imports of  engines as well as other autoparts and accessories (in constant € as of 2000) 
to/from the four most important Central European countries to the volume of domestic 
automobile production in Germany. By this measure, intra-industry trade in autoparts soared 
from less than € 400 per car produced in Germany in 1995 to almost € 3000 within just eight 
years. The integration of Central European countries through intra-industry trade in autoparts 
is most advanced for Hungary, followed by the Czech Republic and Poland. 
The ranking of the four Central European countries is the same with regard to their share in 
total German imports of engines and other autoparts in 2003 (Figure 5). Taken together, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic accounted for almost 30 
percent of German imports; their share has increased fivefold since 1995. It is important to 
note that the steeply increasing imports of autoparts from Central Europe represent additional 
outsourcing by the German automobile industry, rather than trade diversion to the detriment 
of other low-cost locations such as Spain and Latin America. As shown in Nunnenkamp 
(2004), German imports of autoparts from other locations continued to increase (in real terms) 
when imports from Central Europe gathered momentum. 
 
                                                 
20  We do not consider car bodies and trailers. For a more detailed picture of intra-industry trade in autoparts 
between Central European countries and Germany, see VDA (2004b: 59-68).   16
Figure 4 —  Importance of Trade in Autopartsa between Germany and Central European 














aSum of German exports and imports of engines and other autoparts and accessories to/from 
four Central European countries. — bSum of Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland and Slovak Rep. 
— cIn constant prices of 2000. 
Source: VDA (a). 
Germany still reported an export surplus in 2002 in trade in autoparts with Central and 
Eastern Europe as a whole (including the former Soviet Union and other countries in which 
German automobile companies were less engaged as investors than in the four countries under 
consideration here). However, similar to trade in assembled cars (see Section III above), it is 
no longer true what van Tulder and Ruigrok (1998) observed in the late 1990s, namely that  
Germany has a bilateral trade surplus with all major Central European countries. Rather, the 
German trade balance turned significantly negative vis-à-vis the Czech Republic and Poland 
(Figure 6). Moreover, the trade surplus vis-à-vis the Slovak Republic would shrink from € 1.1 
billion to € 0.3 billion if car bodies were subsumed under autoparts.   17
Figure 5 —  Share of Central European Countries in Germany's Total Imports of Engines 
























aCar bodies not included. — bCzech Rep., Hungary, Poland and Slovak Rep. 
Source: VDA (a). 
Figure 6 —  Trade Balancea for Engines and Other Autoparts: Germany vis-à-vis Central 



























aGerman exports minus German imports. Car bodies not included. — b2002 instead of 2003; 
including Russian Federation. 
Source: VDA (a).   18
V.  Labour Market Implications 
The labour market implications of the relocation of assembly lines and the outsourcing of 
parts production to Central Europe are heavily disputed among German economists. The 
notion of Germany degenerating into a bazaar economy has been coined by Sinn (2004). 
Accordingly, companies use outsourcing to overcome the competitive disadvantages at home. 
This is considered the reason why real value added of the German industry increased by only 
5 percent between 1995 and 2003 and industrial employment decreased by 10 percent, even 
though industrial production increased by 15 percent. Sinn (2004) explicitly refers to the 
automobile industry to substantiate the argument that German companies remain competitive 
in international markets only because of “their Eastern European hinterland.” The export of 
Audi passenger cars whose engines are produced in Hungary is presented as an example of 
German sales of “high-quality products that were not produced in the country.” One may add 
that even the assembly of automobiles is increasingly taking place in Central Europe, as 
shown in Section III. 
Most interestingly, the opponents of this view, too, refer to the automobile industry when 
stressing positive labour market effects of international production networks and outsourcing. 
For example, Klodt (2004) argues that employment losses are concentrated in industries that 
have failed to make use of outsourcing, whereas high outward FDI and imports of autoparts 
are supposed to have helped a significant increase in employment in the German automobile 
industry since 1995.
21 Bechert and Cellarius (2004) point out that in the industry “supplying 
motor car parts, there is now for every two firms that are shifting production abroad, one that 
is retransferring it back to Germany.”
22 Furthermore, these authors mention “numerous 
positive examples of outsourcing processes” that went along with rising employment at the 
companies' German home base. The latter observation tends to support the reasoning of 
Becker et al. (2004), according to whom vertical FDI may add to employment at home if cost 
reduction through outsourcing supports an overall expansion of the company (Section II). 
The evidence presented in the following qualifies both of these seemingly opposing views. 
Table 3 underscores that overall employment in the German automobile industry has   
 
                                                 
21   For a similar line of reasoning, see VDA (2004b: 9). 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   20
recovered substantially after the recession in 1993/94. Furthermore, the average wage earned 
in the automobile industry was 24 percent higher than the average wage earned in the German 
manufacturing sector at the beginning of 2004 (VDA a, 2004: 323). Earlier wage comparisons 
reported by Spatz and Nunnenkamp (2002a: 67) suggest that the wage differential in favour of 
the automobile industry remained fairly stable over the last two decades. The earnings and 
employment situation does not appear to have suffered so far from relocation and outsourcing 
if the German automobile industry as a whole is compared to other manufacturing industries. 
Yet, Sinn (2004) has a point when stressing the gap between production and value-added 
trends. Table 3 reveals that the share of value added in gross production of the automobile 
industry (motor vehicles and parts) declined by 8 percentage points in just eight years, to 25 
percent in 2003. The President of the Association of the German Automobile Industry 
considers it an important challenge to reverse this trend (VDA 2004a). 
Both sides of the debate tend to ignore diverging developments within the German automobile 
industry. Spatz and Nunnenkamp (2002a; 2002b)  argue that the inter-industry perspective 
summarized above needs to be complemented in several respects. For a start, the 
differentiation of the automobile industry into assembly operations (including engines) and 
the production of parts and accessories in Table 3 reveals striking intra-industry differences: 
•  The decline in the share of value added in production has been particularly pronounced for 
assembly operations. The value-added share is considerably higher in parts production, 
and the decline was less dramatic than in assembly operations. 
•  Employment growth was by far higher in parts production than in assembly operations. 
This may have been helped by relatively low wages in the former segment of the 
automobile industry. However, the wage gap did not widen during the period under 
consideration.
23  
These observations fit into the reasoning of Spatz and Nunnenkamp (2002a: 74) as well as 
Nunnenkamp (2004: 35), who argue that autoparts producers adjusted quite successfully to 
fiercer competitive pressure from lower-income countries, including Central European 
countries, by specializing in production lines in which they enjoyed comparative cost 
advantages. In this context, it may be noted that Sinn’s (2004) reference to Audi engines as 
                                                 
23  Wages paid in parts production amounted to 81-85 percent of wages paid in assembly operations in 1995-
2003.   21
exemplifying the trend towards a German bazaar economy is misleading. As shown in the 
preceding section, trade in autoparts between Germany and Hungary was almost balanced, not 
least because German input suppliers exported engine parts in the order of  € 500 million to 
Hungary. 
There is another dimension of intra-industry diversity, namely diverging employment and 
income trends for specific groups of employees. It is in two ways that we try to capture the 
skill-specific employment and wage effects of  relocation and outsourcing: First, we use the 
dichotomy of production versus non-production workers to proxy for skill levels, applying the 
conventional assumption that non-production workers are better qualified than production 
workers. Second, we consider three categories (so-called Leistungsgruppen) of production 
workers in the German automobile industry to assess whether employment and earnings 
trends diverged between better paid production workers with more demanding tasks 
(Leistungsgruppe  1) and production workers with lower pay and less demanding tasks 
(Leistungsgruppen 2 and 3). 
Both approaches to account for skill-specific employment and wage effects reveal that the 
benefits which relocation and outsourcing may offer to the automobile industry as a whole are 
not equally distributed within the industry. According to Figure 7, the employment share of 
production workers has declined by six percentage points since the early 1990s. Employment 
losses in the first half of the 1990s rested almost exclusively on production workers, whereas 
the subsequent recovery of overall employment in the German automobile industry benefited 
non-production workers over-proportionally. Compared to the change in employment shares, 
the earnings of production workers declined only marginally relative to the earnings of non-
production workers. 
It is debatable, however, whether the labour market situation of production workers 
deteriorated mainly because German automobile companies discovered Central European 
countries as competitive suppliers of assembled cars and inputs. Spatz and Nunnenkamp 
(2002a) compared longer-term labour market trends for production workers and non-
production workers and found that the employment and earnings opportunities of the former  
   22
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aPercent of total employment of production and non-production workers. — 
bPer-capita 
annual earnings of production workers in percent of per-capita annual earnings of non-
production workers.  
Source: VDA (a). 
 
deteriorated in the 1980s already. Moreover, if the “Eastern European hinterland” (Sinn 2004) 
had a larger effect on production workers than, for example, the previous integration of Spain 
into the networks of German automobile companies, changes in employment shares and 
relative earnings should have been particularly pronounced since 1996, when both the 
assembly of automobiles in Central Europe and intra-industry trade with the region gathered 
momentum (see Sections III and IV). This is not the case according to Figure 7. 
Our second measure has some limitations, too. Throughout the period under consideration, 
more than half of production workers are grouped into category 1 and are, thus, considered 
highly skilled. On the other hand, few production workers are grouped into category 3 (even 
though their share in overall employment of production workers varied considerably over   23
time)
24. This may raise doubts as to whether categories 1-3 adequately reflect skill 
differentials which we regard as the critical criterion to assess intra-industry distributional 
effects. These limitations notwithstanding, Figure 8 supports the view that the emergence of 
Central Europe as an attractive production location and a competitive trading partner 
significantly affected the labour market situation of specific categories of production workers: 
•  Less skilled workers (categories 2+3) accounted for a declining share in overall 
employment of production workers.
25 Moreover, this decline was particularly sharp when 
the assembly of automobiles in, and intra-industry trade with Central Europe developed 
most dynamically. 
•  Furthermore, relative wages of less skilled workers declined only modestly (when 
comparing category 3 with category 1) or even improved (when comparing category 2 
with category 1) in the first half of the 1990s. In sharp contrast, a significant drop in 
relative wages has occurred since 1996. 
All in all, the evidence suggests that the different views on relocation and outsourcing, 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, are not inconsistent with each other. Rather, they 
refer to two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, the automobile industry as a whole still 
compares favourably with other manufacturing industries in terms of employment and income 
opportunities. On the other hand, relocation and outsourcing have resulted in distributional 
effects within the German automobile industry. The rising human-capital intensity of 
automobile production in Germany, reflected in the structure of employment, and declining 
relative wages of less skilled employees are longer-term phenomena that cannot be attributed 
exclusively to the emergence of Central Europe as an attractive location for assembly 
operations and autoparts production. Especially for less skilled production workers, however, 
the competition from Central Europe has added to pressure on relative wages and employment 
opportunities. 
                                                 
24   Therefore, we combine categories 1 and 2 for calculating employment shares in Figure 8. 
25  Walker (1999) shows that less skilled production workers (and also less skilled non-production workers) 
were affected most when the foreign engagement of German autoparts suppliers went along with declining 
employment in Germany. Negative employment effects were more frequent when the foreign engagement 
was motivated by cost considerations, rather than market considerations.   24
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VI.   Summary and Conclusions 
The economic transformation of Central European countries has added significantly to 
competitive pressure in the automobile industry, even though this industry is relatively 
technology and human-capital intensive and, thus, represents a traditional manufacturing 
stronghold of advanced countries such as Germany. The relocation of assembly operations has 
affected domestic production by inducing higher imports of finished cars from Central Europe 
and, possibly, also by reducing the growth of exports from the German home base of 
automobile companies. At the same time, competitive pressure is due to outsourcing of 
automotive parts and accessories and intensive intra-industry trade between Germany and 
Central European countries.   25
The finding that the German automobile industry still compares favourably with other 
manufacturing industries in terms of employment and income opportunities supports the view 
that relocation and outsourcing are important means for German companies to remain 
competitive. This invites the conclusion that the integration of Central Europe into the 
international division of labour is also in the interest of the workers employed in the German 
automobile industry. However, the benefits to be derived from relocation and outsourcing are 
not equally distributed within the industry. Especially for low skilled production workers, the 
competition from Central Europe has intensified pressure on relative wages and impaired 
employment opportunities. 
Labour market implications for low skilled workers are likely to become more serious in 
coming years. Heymann (2004) notes that almost all major automobile assemblers have 
announced plans to establish additional production facilities in Central and Eastern Europe; it 
is expected that production capacity in the region will double until 2006/07, which would add 
to the overcapacity problem the automobile industry is facing on an international scale. At the 
same time, recent industrial disputes, especially the cases of Opel and Volkswagen mentioned 
in the Introduction, tend to support the reasoning of van Tulder and Ruigrok (1998). The 
move of German car producers, being confronted with high wages and relatively strong 
component suppliers at home, to Central Europe is regarded by these authors as a means to 
improve their bargaining position in Germany. Agreements on wage restraint and longer 
working hours negotiated in 2004 point to a weakening bargaining position of trade unions in 
the German automobile industry. 
Nevertheless, wage differentials between Germany and Central Europe are likely to remain 
large in the medium run. In 2003, labour costs in the four major Central European host 
countries of German automobile companies amounted to only about one sixth of labour costs 
in Germany (VDA 2004b: 23); and Havas (2000: 241) argued already in 2000 that “the 
productivity gap has almost been closed.” This suggests that vertical strategies will continue 
to be attractive. In other words, it will probably take long until “the catching-up  process (of 
Central Europe) will have a tendency to increase investments by horizontal multinationals and 
depress investments by vertical multinationals” (Carstensen and Toubal 2003: 17).
26 
                                                 
26  In a similar vein, Heymann (2004) posits that Central Europe will enjoy a lasting competitive advantage in 
labour costs; see also VDA (2004b: 25-26).    26
It follows that the need for the German automobile industry to adjust to fiercer competition 
from lower-income countries, notably from Central and Eastern Europe, is unlikely to 
subside. For the industry as a whole, there is no reasonable alternative to innovation and 
specialization according to comparative cost advantages. Specialization will help secure 
employment and income opportunities for skilled workers, but it offers little relief to low 
skilled workers. Moreover, wage restraint will provide only part of the solution for low skilled 
workers in the German automobile industry. Unless they succeed to improve their level of 
qualification, the employment and income prospects of this part of the labour force can be 
expected to deteriorate.    27
References 
Bechert, S., and G. Cellarius (2004). Outsourcing Offers a Chance for the Development of 
Strongly Competitive European Enterprises. ifo Schnelldienst 7/2004 
(http://www.cesifo.de). 
Becker, S.O., K. Ekholm, R. Jäckle and M.-A. Mündler (2004), Location Choice and 
Employment Decisions: A Comparison of German and Swedish Multinationals. Paper 
presented at the Kiel Workshop on Multinationals and International Integration. Kiel, 
October 8-9, mimeo. 
Buch, C., J. Kleinert and F. Toubal (2003). Determinants of German FDI: New Evidence 
from Micro-Data. Deutsche Bundesbank, Economic Research Centre Discussion Paper 
09/03. Frankfurt a.M. 
Carr, D.L., J.R. Markusen and K.E. Maskus (2001). Estimating the Knowledge-Capital Model 
of the Multinational Enterprise. American Economic Review 91 (3): 693–708. 
Carstensen, K., and F. Toubal (2003). Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern 
European Countries: A Dynamic Panel Analysis. Kiel Working Papers 1143. Institute 
for World Economics, Kiel. 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2004). Kapitalverflechtung mit dem Ausland. Statistische 
Sonderveröffentlichung 10. Frankfurt a.M. 
Dichtl, E., and P. Hardock (1997). Auslandsfertigung und Produktionsverlagerung von 
Unternehmen des Fahrzeugbaus: Ergebnisse einer empirischen Studie. University of 
Mannheim, Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre und Marketing Working Paper 122. 
Mannheim. 
Hanson, G., R.J. Mataloni and M. Slaughter (2001). Expansion Strategies of U.S. 
Multinational Firms. NBER Working Paper 8433, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Havas, A. (2000). Changing Patterns of Inter- and Intra-regional Division of Labour: Central 
Europe’s Long and Winding Road. In: J. Humphrey, Y. Lecler and M. Salerno (eds.), 
Global Strategies, Local Realities: The Auto Industry in Emerging Markets. 
Basingstoke (Macmillan): 234–262. 
Helpman, E. (1984). A Simple Theory of International Trade with Multinational 
Corporations. Journal of Political Economy 92 (3): 451–471. 
Helpman, E., and P. Krugman (1985). Market Structure and Foreign Trade. Cambridge, MA 
(MIT Press). 
Heymann, E. (2004). Perspektiven Automobilindustrie, Bauwirtschaft, Baumaschinenbau. 
Deutsche Bank Research. Frankfurt a.M. 
Humphrey, J., and O. Memedovic (2003). The Global Automotive Industry Value Chain: 
What Prospects for Upgrading by Developing Countries. UNIDO Sectoral Studies 
Series, Vienna.   28
Kinkel, S. (2004). Automobilzulieferer in der Klemme. Stand und Entwicklung der 
Auslandsproduktion bei deutschen Automobilzulieferern. Fraunhofer Institut für 
Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung, Karlsruhe, mimeo. 
Kleinert, J. (2003). Growing Trade in Intermediate Goods: Outsourcing, Global Sourcing, or 
Increasing Importance of MNE Networks? Review of International Economics 11 (3): 
464–482. 
Klodt, H. (2004). Deutschland: Eine Basar-Ökonomie? http://www.uni-kiel.de/ifw/staff/ 
klodt/basaroekonomie.pdf). 
Lansbury, M., N. Pain and K. Smidkova (1996). Foreign Direct Investment in Central Europe 
since 1990: An Econometric Study. National Institute Economic Review (May): 104–
114. 
Marin, D., A. Lorentowicz and A. Raubold (2003). Ownership, Capital or Outsourcing: What 
Drives German Investment to Eastern Europe? In: H. Herrmann et al. (eds.), Foreign 
Direct Investment in the Real and Financial Sector of Industrial Countries. Berlin 
(Springer): 147–163. 
Markusen, J. R. (1984). Multinationals, Multi-plant Economies, and the Gains from Trade. 
Journal of International Economics 16(3/4): 205–226. 
Markusen, J.R., and A.J. Venables (1998). Multinational Firms and the New Trade Theory. 
Journal of International Economics 46 (2): 183-203. 
Markusen, J.R., and A.J. Venables (2000). The Theory of Endowment, Intra-industry and 
Multinational Trade. Journal of International Economics 52: 209–234. 
Nunnenkamp, P. (2004). Automobilstandort Deutschland unter Wettbewerbsdruck. ifo 
Schnelldienst 57 (7): 28–36. 
OECD (2004). International Trade by Commodities Statistics. CD-ROM, Paris. 
Pries, L. (1999). Auf dem Weg  zu global operierenden Konzernen? BMW, Daimler-Benz und 
Volkswagen: Die drei Großen der deutschen Automobilindustrie. Munich (Rainer 
Hampp Verlag). 
Sinn, H.-W. (2004). Bazaar Economy. ifo-Viewpoint 50 (http://www.cesifo.de). 
Spatz, J., and P. Nunnenkamp (2002a). Globalisierung der Automobilindustrie: 
Wettbewerbsdruck, Arbeitsmarkteffekte und Anpassungsreaktionen. Kiel Studies 317. 
Berlin (Springer-Verlag). 
Spatz, J., and P. Nunnenkamp (2002b). Globalization of the Automobile Industry: Traditional 
Locations under Pressure? Aussenwirtschaft 57 (4): 469–493. 
Sturgeon, T.J., and R.L. Florida (1999). The World That Changed the Machine: Globalization 
and Jobs in the Automotive Industry. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge, MA. 
UNCTAD (1998). World Investment Report 1998. New York (United Nations).   29
van Tulder, R. (2004). Peripheral Regionalism: The Consequences of Integrating Central and 
Eastern Europe in the European Automobile Space. In: J. Carillo, Y. Lung and R. van 
Tulder (eds.), Cars: Carriers of Regionalism? Basingstoke (Palgrave): 96-112. 
van Tulder, R., and W. Ruigrok (1998). European Cross-National Production Networks in the 
Auto Industry: Eastern Europe as the Low End of European Car Complex. Berkeley 
Roundtable on the International Economy, University of California 
(http://repositories.cdlib.org/brie/BRIEWP121). 
VDA (a)(various issues). Tatsachen und Zahlen aus der Kraftverkehrswirtschaft. Frankfurt 
a.M.: Verband der Automobilindustrie. 
VDA (b)(various issues). International Auto Statistics.  Frankfurt a.M.: Verband  der 
Automobilindustrie. 
VDA (2004a). VDA-Präsident: Appell für mehr Wertschöpfung in Deutschland – 
Exportrekord – Höherer Dieselanteil. VDA Aktuell-Presse, January 29 
(http://www.vda.de). 
VDA (2004b). Die deutsche Automobilindustrie in der erweiterten EU – Motor der 
Integration. Frankfurt a.M.: Verband der Automobilindustrie. 
Vickery, G. (1996). Globalisation in the Automobile Industry: In: OECD, Globalisation of 
Industry. Overview and Sector Reports. Paris. 
Walker, B. (1999). Der Stellenwert von Auslandsstandorten als Instrument zur Bewältigung 
von Absatz- und Kostenproblemen in der nordrhein-westfälischen Automobil-
Zuliefererindustrie. In:  H. Kilper and L. Pries (eds.),  Die Globalisierungspirale  in  der 
deutschen Automobilindustrie: Hersteller-Zulieferer-Beziehungen als 
Herausforderungen für Wirtschaft und Politik. Munich (Rainer Hampp Verlag): 191–
221. 
Weiß, J.-P. (2000). Die deutsche Automobilindustrie im internationalen Wettbewerb. DIW-
Wochenbericht 12/00 (http://www.diw-berlin.de/diwwbd/00-12-2.html). 
Zhang, K.H., and J.R. Markusen (1999). Vertical Multinationals and Host-country 
Characteristics. Journal of Development Economics 59: 233–252. 
 
 
 
 